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Abstract 
This paper proposes that while many plans and solutions to the transport problems of 
the 21st Century have been mooted, very few have succeeded in significantly 
improving the situation within Europe. It is suggested that many schemes face 
problems at the project implementation stage due to adverse public and/or political 
reaction. This paper incorporates a series of vignettes, several of which are based on 
in-depth interviews with practitioners directly involved in the implementation of the 
schemes in question. It looks at several existing ‘radical’ transport schemes from 
around the world in an attempt to draw lessons as to how they overcame this, not least 
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in terms of how the implementation of alternative strategies by European policy-
makers could be shaped and adopted world-wide. 
Key words: transport policy, policy implementation, transport demand management, 
case studies. 
Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged across the developed world that transport systems within 
many of its member states are stretched to breaking point. Since the 1950s, nearly all 
developed countries have witnessed a ‘mobility explosion’. For instance, between 
1991 and 2001, car and taxi traffic levels in billion vehicle kilometres increased by 
12% in the United States, 44% in Japan, 8% in Germany, and 14% in Great Britain, 
while usage almost doubled in Portugal (85%) and more than doubled in Spain 
(107%)1 (DfT, 2003).  
This has resulted from an increase in road capacity, income and population. Both 
income and population growth are viewed as the major drivers behind increasing 
vehicle ownership and use (Marshall et al, 1997; Marshall and Banister, 2000). In the 
EU-15, there was a 34% increase in the number of vehicles owned between 1985 and 
1995, with the number of cars on EU-15 roads growing from 60.77 to 165.54 million, 
an average growth rate of approximately 4% per annum. Thus, by 1996, there were 
444 cars per 1000 EU-15 inhabitants (EC, 1999). A report by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development predicted that this would increase by a 
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further 50% between 1995 and 2020, resulting in vehicle ownership levels of more 
than 600 per 1000 people in many EU-15 countries (OECD, 1995a). 
While many plans and solutions have been debated, none has yet succeeded in 
significantly improving the transport situation within Europe. For instance in the UK, 
road user charging has been consistently touted by academics and transport planners 
as the ideal policy mechanism for traffic reduction since the 1960s, but was only 
implemented for the first time on a sizeable scale in February 2003. Moreover, the 
long term future of the central London scheme is still by no means guaranteed, with 
the Conservative Mayoral candidate Stephen Norris having declared his intention to 
abolish the scheme if elected (Wolmar, 2004). It is suggested within this paper that 
many of the problems experienced when trying to introduce ‘radical’ transport 
schemes are due to public and/or political opposition at the project implementation 
stage. A number of additional barriers – most notably resource, institutional and 
policy barriers, social, cultural, legal, and physical barriers - have also precluded such 
actions (Banister, 2002).  
The most difficult barriers to overcome are the social and cultural barriers, which can 
also be described as public and/or political opposition. This perception is supported 
by Gunn (1978) in a seminal paper on ‘perfect implementation’ which has particular 
relevance in the transport sector (Ison and Rye, 2002). Gunn states that ‘the 
circumstances external to the implementing agency should not impose crippling 
constraints’. In other words, for implementation to occur, one needs to ensure that the 
policy is acceptable to all parties that have the power to veto it (Ison and Rye, 2002). 
Assuming rational behaviour, the policy-making actors will devise strategies for the 
implementation process, which will result in maximising their own benefits: as such 
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there will be both winners and losers and/or successful and unsuccessful 
implementation. There are examples of urban areas that have managed to implement 
radical car restraint policies without the associated negative consequences often 
experienced.  
The aim of the paper is to examine a selection of existing schemes from across the 
world and briefly describe some of the common difficulties faced by those responsible 
for implementing transport projects. In order to achieve this objective a series of 
vignettes were constructed based on in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, which 
is all important when attempting to understand the reasons for scheme 
implementation. The paper explains how transport practitioners have overcome 
adverse public reaction in practice. For example, the paper outlines how the ‘Ring of 
Steel’ in London was introduced, how Electronic Road Pricing was ‘sold’ to the 
public in Singapore, and how motorists pay to enter Manhattan and San Francisco via 
bridge and tunnel charges. Eight strategies are identified for future policy 
implementation. Four of the strategies focus on ‘sweetening the pill’ of potentially 
unpopular measures while three aim to convince the motorist that the new policy is in 
fact a reasonable response to the traffic problem. The final strategy suggests that 
transport policy goals need to be met through the sympathetic introduction of other 
ostensibly unrelated policies – or ‘joined-up’ policy-making. Finally the paper offers 
some lessons for European policy-makers, revealing how ‘alternative’ implementation 
strategies could be shaped and adopted within Europe.  
It is important to state at the outset that the case studies are at a high level of 
generalisation. In each case one key issue/aspect has been identified. This is not to say 
that the implementation of any such initiative can be distilled down to simply one 
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factor but the aim has been to offer an insight which may provide an important 
catalyst for change in urban areas worldwide. 
What is meant by ‘Implementation’?  
The term ‘implementation’ can be defined in many ways. For the purposes of this 
paper, ‘implementation’ can be viewed as: ‘policies, actions or decisions relevant to 
the target population that can be put into effect at ‘street level’, and ‘implementers’ as 
those responsible for doing that. As the definition implies, the policy process does not 
end once agreement has been reached on a proposal. The agreement still has to be 
implemented before the policy has any real existence. Bardach (1977) has described 
the implementation process as a game (see also Mendrinou, 1996: 13-16). According 
to Lane (1995), there are a number of aspects of the implementation process other 
than the accomplishment of the policy objectives. These include: the strategies and 
tactics employed by various parties to the implementation game the mechanism of 
delay as a decision parameter, the variety of motives among the participating actors, 
and the need for coalition building and fixing the game.  
As implementation theory suggests, one of the most favourable conditions for 
successful implementation is where policy-makers and implementers develop a co-
operative relationship (Richardson, 1996: 290). Indeed, Cram (1997: 84) suggests ‘if 
policies are formulated in the absence of active and enthusiastic participation by those 
whose co-operation is essential at the implementation stage, then implementation 
failure is more likely’. Pressman and Wildawsky (1984) suggest that correct 
implementation usually involves several semi-independent organisations or agencies, 
each of which can, to a large extent, block or change the direction of implementation. 
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When a situation arises where implementation failure becomes so evident that a 
process of ‘re-steering’ (Lundquist, 1972: 33) has to take place, policy-makers must 
take action to encourage or force implementers to behave in ways more likely to 
achieve the set policy objectives (Richardson, 1996).  
The Alternative Strategies 
The following vignettes form practical examples of how existing examples of radical 
transport schemes might be classified according to a simple strategic implementation 
framework. 
Compensating losers2 
The introduction of road user charging in Singapore in 1975 has long been seen as a 
‘one off’ event, which was only possible because of unique circumstances not least in 
that the citizens are essentially law abiding, and that there are no alternative cities for 
businesses to relocate to. While this certainly played a large part in the introduction of 
the original low-tech Area Licensing Scheme which used paper windshield stickers 
enforced through visual inspection by traffic inspectors within a single cordon, it was 
somewhat less important when an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system was adopted 
in 1998.  
Instead, what is less well publicised is that the Singapore Government made a policy 
decision to ensure that the majority of people benefited as a result of the change. This 
was achieved by granting rebates to certain road user groups. For example, taxis were 
given road tax rebates for the first three years after implementation, while businesses 
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were given four years of rebates. In addition, a $S60 (€31.3) a month levy imposed on 
owners of non-residential parking spaces was replaced by a nominal $S1 (€0.52) per 
space per month licence fee in the same year. In other words, the Government 
effectively ‘bribed’ the public to ensure that the scheme had a chance of working in 
the first year, and gambled on the scheme being accepted by the time the rebates were 
withdrawn. 
Such an approach was suitable as the main objective of the scheme was/and is to 
manage traffic levels rather than raise revenue. The costs of the ‘subsidies’ were 
written off as a necessary implementation cost. 
Bribing the motorist not to drive 
Certainly the most overt way of ‘incentivising’ drivers out of their cars is by paying to 
them not to use their cars for certain trips - i.e. effectively bribing motorists to use an 
alternative mode. One application of this principle – the parking cash out – is 
becoming increasingly common in the UK. Annual schemes operate at Southampton 
General Hospital (Bailey, 2002) and at Orange’s new Bristol office (Baker, 2003), 
while a monthly pass system operates at the Vodafone offices in Newbury, Berkshire 
(Hopkins, 2003). 
Still more radical, the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer began operating a parking cash out 
scheme that rewards non-car commuters on a daily basis among staff at its research 
and production facilities. The scheme was launched at Sandwich, in Kent in June 
2001 and at Walton Oaks near Reigate, Surrey in December 2001 (Elliot and 
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Chadwick, 2002). This works by using staff personalised security pass ‘proximity 
card’ technology with an employee’s card credited with enough points to ‘pay’ for 
one month’s parking. The card opens the parking barriers and records how many 
points are used. If not used for parking, staff then cash in these parking points at the 
end of each month, which are paid through the payroll. Staff at the Sandwich site 
receive £2 (€2.9) per day for leaving their car at home, while at Walton Oaks the 
incentive is £5 (€7.2) a day – a reflection of the far tighter parking standards set by the 
local planning authority at the Reigate site. Overall, it is estimated that the value of 
cash outs given to staff will amount approximately £0.5m (€0.72m) a year, and 
currently around a third of staff travel to work by modes other than the private car. 
It is not only parking spaces that motorists are paid to give up – in some cases they are 
paid to give up their cars. For example, during Green Transport Week in June 1999, 
public transport operator ‘First Glasgow’ introduced the ‘Swap a banger for a bus’ 
scheme, which led to more than 500 residents from Glasgow swapping their car for an 
annual bus pass worth £560 (€810) (BIA, 1999). In the USA too, a car cash out 
project is being tested by the State of Washington and public transport operator King 
County Metro in Seattle, through funding from the Federal Highway Administration 
value pricing programme (VPP, 2001). 
Highlighting the benefits3 
By contrast in Oslo, Norway, road tolls were introduced in the city to raise money in 
order to pay for new transport infrastructure, and not to reduce traffic congestion. This 
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meant that the ‘rebate route’ might exempt too many people for the required amount 
of money to be raised. Indeed, the charges introduced were relatively low and were 
spread across the ‘population’ as far as possible so that they could maintain traffic 
levels and maximise revenue.  
In the Norwegian case therefore, the important objective was to convince the public 
that the money they were being asked to pay was being used to directly benefit them 
as motorists. Accordingly, much effort was spent on a well targeted and publicised 
information campaign, which was aided by the charge being implemented only 14 
days after the Oslo Tunnel (later renamed Festningstunnelen - the Castle Tunnel) was 
opened to traffic.  
Offering more choice to the road user 
The key reason for drivers accepting the High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane facility on 
Interstate 15 to the north of San Diego, is that drivers are offered a genuine and 
informed choice. Motorists can use the general purpose lanes for free with the 
likelihood of being delayed, or else they can pay but enjoy a hassle free and 
predictable journey time. 
The HOT facility originally opened in 1988 as a High Occupancy Vehicle lane to 
buses, vanpools and two-person carpools (Shreffler et al, 2001). In 1991, it was 
suggested that the lanes could be opened to single occupancy vehicles (SOV) as only 
50% of the two lanes’ capacity was being utilised while adjacent general-purpose 
lanes were experiencing severe congestion during peak periods. It was not until 
December 1996 that the HOT lane became a reality.  
As drivers approach the HOT lane, variable message signs advise them of the 
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toll to use the facility. The level of this toll depends on how much spare capacity is 
available in the general purpose lanes, and varies from $US0.50 (€0.56) to $US4 
(€4.5) in normal circumstances, with drivers paying more to use HOT lane when the 
general purpose lanes are congested. Around $US430,000 (€481,000) of the annual 
$US1.6m (€1.8m) toll revenue covers operating costs, and $US60,000 (€67,000) is 
received by the California Highway Patrol in order to enforce the operation of the 
lanes. State law requires the remaining money to be spent on developing the express 
lanes and improving the public transport service along the corridor, specifically, the 
express bus service known as the Inland Breeze, which began operating in November 
1997. While initially there were concerns that the lanes would become ‘Lexus Lanes’ 
- i.e. only used by the rich - this has not been borne out in practice. 
The lesser of two evils 
Related to this, is the idea that the public is provided with two choices, one of which 
is even more politically unpalatable – yet just as logical or reasonable – as the 
favoured one. A recent example of this approach occurred in the City of Durham 
before the introduction of the congestion charge near the Cathedral in October 2002 
(McGargill, 2002).  
In summary, the problem was that traffic was causing problems for the World 
Heritage Site of the city’s cathedral and castle, as well as for pedestrian shoppers in 
the city centre. Accordingly, a transport study demonstrated that action needed to be 
taken – a position appreciated by almost everyone – either car drivers were to be 
charged for driving in the congestion area or else banned altogether. Given the 
alternative, it became the less controversial route for the council to adopt the access 
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charge. 
It might have been worse… 
A similar tactic was used to herald the introduction of London’s Congestion Charge in 
February 2003. Hostile newspaper reporting prior to the introduction of the charge 
and predictions of traffic chaos by the London Mayor (Webster, 2003), combined 
with a lessening in traffic due to a half term school holiday, meant that for the first 
week the charge performed far better than expected. Consequently, after the first week 
of congestion charging the scheme was seen as a policy success. Further research is 
obviously required however before labels such as ‘success’ or ‘failure’ can be 
assigned to this scheme.  
Adapting tried, tested and accepted methods 
Despite the recent media frenzy surrounding the launch of the London Congestion 
Charging Scheme in February 2003, two of the largest cities in the United States (San 
Francisco and New York City) have been charging vehicles to enter or exit downtown 
areas for many years. The two cities were able to introduce such a measure with 
virtually no adverse political problems. Drivers are required to pay tolls to cross eight 
‘Caltrans’ bridges in the Bay Area of California, including the four bridges to enter 
San Francisco (Caltrans, 2000). Similarly in New York City, drivers crossing into 
Manhattan must pay to use seven of the city’s bridges and two tunnels (MTA, 2003). 
This apparent public acceptance indicates that drivers are happy to pay to use a 
facility such as a bridge or a tunnel, whereas the idea of paying to enter the downtown 
area of a city would be extremely controversial. Fundamentally though, it could be 
argued that there is no real difference in that both are paying to use a designated 
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section of road. The lesson here would therefore seem to be that ‘traditional’ charges 
that have been in place and accepted for many years might do an equally effective job 
as something seen as new, radical and threatening, but with rather less opposition. In 
addition, paying for a new ‘service’ is less galling than paying for something that 
previously cost nothing. 
The Trojan Horse 
Perhaps the classic case of a transport policy being introduced by a ‘trigger 
mechanism’ – i.e. on the back of a totally unrelated policy – is that of the so-called 
‘Ring of Steel’ imposed on the City of London in 1993. This policy was instigated 
almost overnight in response to a terrorist bomb attack in Bishopsgate, and involved 
restricting access to the central core of the city. In addition to the closure of 17 minor 
streets and the conversion of 13 roads to one way, traffic signals were altered at 23 
junctions and public transport and pedestrians were given greater priority (Cairns et 
al, 1998). Overall, as a result of what was a security policy – in the eyes of the public 
at least - traffic entering the restricted area fell by a quarter from 160,000 vehicles a 
day, and pollution levels were 15% lower. There was however, a slight increase in 
traffic levels on the zone boundary. 
Interestingly, the bomb exploded only a month before a traffic scheme known as “The 
Key to the Future” was due to be implemented that was also designed to restrict 
traffic for environmental reasons, and so significant elements of this proposal were 
incorporated into the security operation.  
The Manchester bomb that exploded on Corporation Street in the City Centre on 15 
June 1996 caused severe damage to the buildings and infrastructure of the city’s retail 
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and commercial district and enabled the city stakeholders (e.g. local politicians, 
residents and retail organisations) to think boldly about transport issues. The bomb 
resulted in the closure of four central streets and yet the city continued to function 
normally. As such, the closures were made permanent as far as general traffic was 
concerned with a small number of streets being pedestrianised, whereas in other 
streets, access was limited to buses, taxis and servicing vehicles, or in some cases, the 
direction of traffic was altered thereby changing the routes of some of the city’s bus 
services (GMTU, 2001).  
Overall therefore, it may be worth transport planners becoming more involved with 
the Emergency Planning sections at local councils. A note of warning is that care 
must be taken in choosing the ‘right sort’ of emergency. For example, the fuel 
shortages caused by a blockade of refineries by hauliers and farmers during 
September 2000 – arguably an unforeseeable emergency - were blamed on the 
Government and not the protesters, due to the high level of tax on fuel, presumably 
because it is under the Government’s control. It is questionable whether this was the 
right sort of ‘emergency’. War or problems in the Middle East on the other hand, have 
allowed Governments to ration petrol (or at least prepare to ration petrol). In the UK 
petrol rationing was implemented between 23 September 1939 and 26 May 1950 due 
to the Second World War, the Suez Crisis in 1956, and was almost adopted during the 
oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 (Harman, 2002).  
Finally, deteriorating air quality due to high traffic levels and unfavourable weather 
conditions have led to Paris and several Italian cities adopting ‘alternate plate’ days, 
whereby only traffic with an odd or even numbered registration plate is allowed into 
the city, and even to total traffic bans. Such action has been driven by concerns over 
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poor health. Similar conditions could perhaps be created by taking advantage of 
particularly bad weather or some other ‘Acts of God’, or more predictably by 
maintenance problems closing roads, bridges (e.g. Hammersmith Bridge, see Rees 
and Williams, 1998) or car parks (for example, Lancashire County Council was 
forced to close an employee multi-storey car park due to structural problems in early 
2003).  
‘Conventional’ Implementation of Good Practice 
The vignettes highlight a number of important lessons that can be learnt from the 
successes and failures of radical demand management schemes to date. As 
demonstrated by the Cambridge experience of road pricing (Ison, 1998), these are not 
necessarily always about the technology issues but can often be about how schemes 
are designed, the effective inclusion of user concerns and political sensitivity. For 
example, there has to be a climate for change, i.e. congestion should be perceived as a 
major problem before the public are likely to accept a change in policy direction. In 
other words, the proposed policy or scheme needs to be supported by politicians of all 
political persuasions and the general public need to understand the problem before 
they are likely to accept or even support it.  
Those responsible for developing the policy or scheme can only gain public 
acceptability if the aims and objectives are clearly defined, complementary to other 
sectoral policies and widely inclusive at all stages of the decision making process - 
from as early on in the process as possible (Wixey & Ruiz, 2003).  
Achieving at least some of the benefits promised as quickly as possible, yet at the 
same time not trying to achieve too much in the early stages are also vital lessons that 
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can be learnt from some of the ‘successful’ schemes highlighted above. In other 
words, it could be argued that piecemeal implementation may create better results 
than implementation by stealth. One of the criticisms often levelled at transport 
schemes is that they do not offer a realistic alternative to travellers who wish to 
switch from the car. Fortunately, this was a lesson that the London Congestion 
Charging scheme took on board, and an increase in the number of buses and bus 
routes provided meant that there was a realistic alternative in place before the 
congestion charge was introduced. 
One of the most important lessons to be learnt is that the implementation process 
needs to be both transparent and flexible. The process must be able to adapt to 
changing circumstances, public attitudes, objectives and technology changes and that 
it can react to ‘unexpected’ events. 
Additional levers 
These ‘conventional’ lessons are certainly important. But what the vignettes also 
demonstrate is that in many cases of successful implementation there were additional 
factors that helped transform uncertain outcomes into positive results. These are 
summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Radical transport schemes should be… 
SAGACIOUS So the public perceive there is a problem and the policy seems 
a reasonable way of solving it. 
COMPENSATORY So the public see they benefit from the scheme, are 
compensated in some way for any disbenefits, or are provided 
with a viable and acceptable alternative means of travel. 
SUPPORTED So the public feel that other organisations or individuals are 
convinced the scheme is the right way to go.
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CONSULTED So the public feel they have been properly consulted as to 
their opinions, and these have at least been listened to and 
ideally acted upon. 
SINE NON QUA So the public feel there is no alternative (or that it is the least 
worst alternative). 
COMPARABLE So the public perceive that the scheme is not so different to 
existing schemes or if they have had experience of similar 
schemes. 
STIMULATED So the public believe that the scheme is implemented as a 
response to some kind of crisis that is beyond the 
Government’s control – e.g. an act of terrorism or a national 
emergency – or obviously for the public good – e.g. drink 
driving, security. 
Clearly, the strategies suggested above are already implemented to varying degrees in 
most transport projects, but have possibly not been set out quite so bluntly in the past. 
It is also obvious that the appropriateness of some or all of these strategies is strongly 
dependent on the particular circumstances of a proposed scheme.  
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that there is no single model of policy implementation that will 
guarantee a successful policy outcomes. It is clear that in many of the more radical 
schemes adopted around the world, additional strategies have been employed, either 
deliberately or almost accidentally. The evidence also suggests that there is scope for 
combining suitable strategies in order to increase acceptability still further. This paper 
has provided an alternative way of looking at the implementation process. 
It is the implementation of a project – and in particular in convincing the public 
and/or local, national and European politicians – rather than the planning or even the 
financing of a project that determines whether it should go ahead or not. As this paper 
suggests, it must be recognised that modelling the process of executing public 
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policies – i.e. the implementation process – is different from evaluating the extent to 
which objectives have been accomplished – the implementation assessment. In 
essence, not all policies that are ‘successfully’ implemented actually meet their 
original objectives. 
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